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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
unable to obtain satisfaction from the trustee, he may, by a bill in equity,
reach the trust assets, and compel the application of it to the authorized
claims against the trustee.19 Where the trustee contracts against personal
liability, therefore, it has been held that the creditor may sue the trustee
as trustee on the agreement, and then receive satisfaction out of the trust
estate.20 In the common-law or Massachusetts trust, the creditor may,
under any circumstances, sue the association directly, since it is regarded
for purposes of suit as a legal entity.21
Since the instant case is one of first impression in our jurisdiction, it is
well to note its consequences so as to be able to deal with trustees and
trust estates accordingly.
M. J. G.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CHILD LABOR AMENDMENT-RIGHT OF STATE TO
RATIFY AFTER REJEcTION-RzAsoNABLE TiME FOR AcTIN-[Kentucky].-
In a recent decision,1 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky has declared in-
effective the attempted ratification by the state legislature of the Child
Labor Amendment.2 The grounds upon which the conclusion of the court
was reached were: (1) that a state legislature, having once rejected an
amendment to the federal Constitution and certified such rejection to the
Secretary of State of the United States, cannot later ratify; (2) that when
more than one-fourth of the state legislatures have rejected an amendment
it becomes dead (irrespective of whether or not notices of rejection have
been certified to the Secretary of State) and resubmission by Congress is
necessary to validate subsequent state action upon it; 3 that even assuming
21 Fla. 203; Hussey v. Arnold (1904) 185 Mass. 202, 70 N. E. 87; Gates v.
Avery (1901) 112 Wis. 271, 87 N. W. 1091.
19. 3 Bogert, op. cit., sec. 725.
20. Id. at sec. 715; Scott, supra, note 3, 731-732. In Jessup v. Smith
(1918) 223 N. Y. 203, 119 N. E. 403, 404, Justice Cardozo said that the
trustee has the power to create a charge equivalent to his own lien for
reimbursement, in favor of the other who renders services under such a
contract.
21. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 728 and 729 expressly so provide; Note (1920)
7 A. L. R. 612, 629.
1. Wise v. Chandler (Ky. 1937) 108 S. W. (2d) 1024.
2. In 1926 the General Assembly of Kentucky adopted a resolution re-
jecting the amendment and its action was certified by the governor to the
Secretary of State of the United States. On January 13, 1937, a special
session of the general assembly adopted a resolution of ratification. See
Acts of fourth special session, 1937, ch. 30. Suit was brought to enjoin the
governor from certifying to the Secretary of State. The petition was later
amended to compel the governor to notify the secretary that the ratification
en route, was to be of no effect and to warn him of the pendency of this
action.
3. The Kentucky court quotes a letter published in the American Bar
Association Journal, July, 1934, by Mr. Frank Grinnell in which he says,
"Since the Constitution requires a vote of three-fourths of the several states
to ratify an amendment, it requires only one state more than one-fourth
to defeat ratification, and it sems to follow that the rule must work both
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that adverse action by more than one-fourth of the state legislatures does
not destroy the vitality of an Amendment, it may become dead if more
than a reasonable time has elapsed since its submission. With reference
to the Child Labor Amendment, the court was of the opinion that the pas-
sage of twelve and one-half years since the submission of the amendment
and the apparent abandonment of the amendment between 1927 and 1933
brought the case within the holding in Dillon v. Gloss4 where it was de-
cided that if there is no ratification within a reasonable time, the Con-
gressional offer becomes inoperative.5
A contrary result was reached by the Supreme Court of Kansas in Cole-
Tan et al. v. Miller,8 in which it was held that the state legislature, al-
though it had rejected the Child Labor Amendment in 1925 and certified
this action to the Secretary of State, could subsequently ratify. The Kansas
holding is in accord with the view generally held by writers on the subjectJl
namely, that ratification is a final act and cannot be withdrawn, while
rejection is not a final act and can be withdrawn. According to this opinion,
it would appear that a state may not reject after ratification even though
no certification of. ratification has been made.8
ways, and when thirteen states (one more than one-fourth of forty-eight
states), have voted not to ratify an amendment, it is no longer pending,
but is defeated until congress sees fit to resubmit it. Otherwise a state
could change its mind in one direction after a final vote of the necessary
number of states, but not in the other direction. In the case of the Child
Labor Amendment, not only thirteen but twenty-six states voted not to rat-
ify. I submit that it was clearly rejected." The court holds that in addition
to the fact the amendment was rejected by more than one-fourth of the
states, twenty-one states in 1926, had not only rejected the amendment, but
had duly certified resolutions thereon to the Secretary of State.
4. Dillon v. Gloss (1921) 256 U. S. 368, 41 S. Ct. 510, 65 L. ed. 994.
The court held that the language of the Constitution (art. 5), authorizing
Congress to propose amendments when it "shall deem it necessary," neces-
sarily implies that ratification to be valid must be sufficiently contemporane-
ous with the submission so that the "necessity" still exists. It was also
held that Congress may provide what it believes to be a reasonable time
for the adoption of a proposed amendment.
5. The average time in which amendments 10-21 were ratified (excluding
the Bill of Rights) is one year and six months with the maximum time of
adoption being three years and six months (Amendment 16).
The court concludes that since Congress, in proposing the 20th and 21st
amendment, limited the period of ratification to seven years, and in view
of the time in which prior amendments were adopted, seven years should
be regarded as a reasonable time in this case.
6. Coleman et al. v. Miller (Secy. of State) (Kan. 1937) 71 P. (2d)
518.
7. Willis, Constitutional Law (1936) 120; Jarret, Amending the Federal
Constitutions (1929) 7 Tenn. L. Rev. 286. Note (1896) 30 Am. L. Rev.
894; 12 C. J., Constitutional Law (1917) 681, sec. 16.
8. This result is reached under Article 5 of the Federal Constitution
which says "the Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem
it necessary, shall propose amendments to this constitution * * * which
shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of this constitution, when
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several states * * *." It
is argued that since the provision mentions ratification but not rejection,
acts of rejection are of no effect.
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No United States Supreme Court decision is available to test the ac-
curacy of these conflicting state court decisions. Whether a state can
ratify after rejection, and whether it makes any difference that the rejec-
tion has or has not been certified is still in question. The nearest analogy
is the usually conceded position that ratification is a final and irrevocable
act, whether or not there has been certification, but this is founded upon
Congressional and not judicial interpretation of the Constitution. 9
It is the belief of this commentator that an amendment should remain
open to ratification, so long as the conditions which induced the original
proposal remain the same. A proposed amendment should continue to be
considered until it is adopted or until it is nullified by the passage of more
than a reasonable time under the Dillon v. Gloss rule. So long as conditions
remain the same, a state legislature should be able to reverse its prior act
of ratification or rejection, irrespective of certification. The argument that
a state can withdraw a rejection and not a ratification, because the fifth
article mentions ratification and not rejection seems specious. Equally un-
convincing seems the contention that rejection by more than one-fourth of
the state legislatures terminates the offer. In the absence of judicial con-
struction of the amending procedure, however, these questions will remain
the subject of legal dispute.
W. A. H.
LABoR--NRRis-GuAmrWA ACT-LABOR DISPUTE--[Federal].-The defen-
dant labor union, in order to compel plaintiff employer to recognize the
union and force his employees to become members, carried on an intensive
campaign of propaganda, persuasion, and threats of force. The employer
had no quarrel with his employees, all of whom were satisfied with their
own shop union. When suit for injunction was brought against the union,
it defended upon the ground that the immunities provided for in the Norris-
LaGuardia Act should be granted defendant, since the situation was a
"labor dispute" within the scope of the Act.' Held, that the injunction
should be granted, since there was no "labor dispute" concerning conditions
The conclusion is also based on the fact that Congress declared the 14th
amendment to be adopted, although New Jersey, Ohio and Oregon attempted
to withdraw a prior certified ratification. Conversely the 14th amendment
was rejected by the legislators of N. Carolina, S. Carolina and Georgia but
later ratified by the reorganized government of those states and in each
instance the ratification was treated as authoritative. The Kentucky court
says that this is no basis for saying that ratification can follow rejection,
since the legislatures which rejected were a part of state governments later
declared illegal.
See (1866) 14 Stat. 428; (1867) 15 Stat. '706, 708; (1870) 16 Stat. 1131.
9. See note 8, supra.
1. Norris-LaGuardia Act (1982) 47 Stat. 70, c. 90, 29 U. S. C. A. secs.
101-115. The purpose of the Act is discussed in note (1936) 84 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 771. One of the most recent resumes of the Act is found in note (1937)
2 Mo. L. Rev. 1.
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